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ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE AND THE 
SECURITIES LAWS 
Robert H. Feller* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In today's highly complex world, government can neither dictate all 
results nor oversee all events. As an alternative to the command-and-
control approach to government regulation, more subtle types of regu-
lation are increasingly being used to promote environmental protection 
goals. One such type of regulation focuses on disclosure. This type of 
regulation is based on the theory that if correct information is made 
available to the public at large, market forces can efficiently accom-
plish many of the goals that government itself seeks. 
In the area of environmental regulation, this approach has recently 
been adopted as part of an enactment popularly known as SARA Title 
IlL1 The statute and its implementing regulations call for industries 
to disclose information about the type and quantity of chemicals they 
produce, use, and routinely and accidentally discharge into the envi-
ronment.2 
Ironically, while the environmental community is extolling the vir-
tues of a newly enacted disclosure statute, two much older statutes 
that require disclosure relating to a corporation's environmentally 
related activities receive less attention. These statutes are the Secu-
* Assistant Commissioner, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 
(NYSDEC); Adjunct Professor, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), School of Management; 
J.D., Albany Law School. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do 
not represent those of the NYSDEC or RPI. 
1 The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, is a self-contained law, com-
prising Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 
99-499, tit. III, §§ 300--30, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,050 
(1988». 
2 MICHAEL S. BARAM, ET AL., MANAGING CHEMICAL RISKS: CORPORATE RESPONSE TO 
SARA TITLE III 1-3 (1990); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,050. 
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rities Act of 19333 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Acts).4 
While the audience for disclosure under the securities laws-actual 
or potential investors-is much narrower than for SARA Title III, it 
is an audience that is capable of influencing corporate policy. 
At the same time, the number of security investors has increased 
dramatically over the past several decades. The need to protect against 
inflation has driven many small investors to use the securities mar-
kets to protect the position of such basic investments as retirement 
and education accounts. The contemporary investor is not as sophis-
ticated as in the past and must rely, directly or indirectly, upon cor-
porate disclosures. Where disclosure is inaccurate or misleading, small 
investors unwittingly take on risks that they may not be able to 
afford, with potentially dire consequences. 
This Article examines the environmental disclosure requirements 
of the Acts and focuses on how the requirements are implemented by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).5 The Article exam-
ines recent disclosure filings of five major companies with environ-
mentally related activities and compares the contents of the filings.6 
The Article concludes that while existing requirements need to be 
tightened, significant benefits would accrue to investors if the SEC 
undertook an aggressive program to enforce existing requirements.7 
In concert with an aggressive enforcement program, the SEC should 
move to close loopholes in its rules.8 The SEC should also rethink the 
question of whether the investor's interest is served by limiting en-
vironmental disclosure to information that is "material," as currently 
defined by rule.9 In the long term, the SEC needs to consider expand-
ing disclosure requirements to protect not only the traditional inves-
tor, whose needs are limited to return on investment, but also the 
socially conscious investor.lO The Article suggests additional means of 
3 Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. 
V 1993)). 
4 Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (1988 & Supp. 
V 1993)). 
5 Disclosure of material environmental liabilities is also required under the Williams Act, Pub. 
L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(dHe), 78n(dHf) 
(1988)), which addresses disclosure requirements of tender offers. It is not, however, addressed 
in this Article. For additional treatment of environmental disclosure under the securities laws, 
see generally, Risa Vetri Ferman, Note, Environmental Disclosures and SEC Reporting Re-
quirements, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 483 (1992). 
6 See infra Section III. 
7 See infra Section IV.A. 
8 See infra Section IV.B. 
9 See infra Section IV.C. 
10 See infra Section V. 
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improving disclosure that are not dependent on SEC action.n Im-
proved environmental disclosure can also be accomplished through 
the regulatory programs of individual states or through private rights 
of action created under the securities laws.12 
II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
As a result of the stock market excesses that led to the crash of 
1929, Congress enacted two landmark statutes: the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.13 The purpose of the 
Acts was to substitute a philosophy of information availability and 
accessibility for one of caveat emptor.14 These laws, and others that 
were added later, are designed principally to protect consumers in the 
financial markets against excessive speculation, misrepresentation, 
and exploitation involving unsound, worthless, or fraudulent securi-
ties.15 
The Acts only provide guidelines concerning disclosure. The imple-
mentation of more detailed disclosure requirements is delegated to 
an administrative agency, which establishes disclosure requirements 
through rulemaking.16 The SEC is the federal agency responsible for 
establishing disclosure requirements under the Acts. Whenever the 
SEC has discretion in setting disclosure requirements, the agency 
balances the value of the information to investors against the burden 
of disclosure on the companyP The point at which the SEC strikes 
that balance defines the outer boundary of required disclosure. 
As environmental issues became more significant for corporate Amer-
ica in the 1970s, the SEC recognized that a special set of rules was 
needed to address environmental disclosure. Rules specifically relat-
ing to environmental liabilities were first adopted in 1971, and have 
since been amended and revised several times. The principal vehicle 
for disclosure is the 10-K form. Each corporation that issues publicly 
11 See infra Section VI. 
12 For a discussion of disclosure issues in a broader context than the securities laws, see the 
symposium Corporate Goverrw,nce and the Environment: Beyond the Transaction Audit, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1291 (1991). 
13 See supra notes 3 and 4. 
14 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
15 See generally LOUIS Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS 35-36 (1983). 
16 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78w(a). 
17 Proposed Environmental Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 5627 [1975-1976 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) , 80,310, at 85,712 (Oct. 14, 1975) [hereinafter Securities Act 
Release No. 5627]. 
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traded equity or debt securities must annually file a 10-K form with 
the SEC.Is 
Currently, the environmental disclosure requirements of the secu-
rities laws are two-tiered. The first tier, affirmative disclosure duties, 
is contained in Regulation S-K.19 After a company makes a required 
disclosure under Regulation S-K, or makes any voluntary disclosure, 
the company must fulfill a secondary requirement. This second tier, 
the so-called "1Ob-5 Rule," requires the company to make further 
disclosure of any additional material facts necessary to avoid render-
ing the original disclosure misleading.20 In addition to these require-
ments, companies are required to disclose contingent liabilities through 
their financial statements. These statements must be prepared ac-
cording to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and vari-
ous interpretive materials. 
The SEC's environmental disclosure requirements rely principally 
on the concept of materiality. The term "material" is defined under 
the Acts, and further guidance is provided through a combination of 
SEC rulemaking, SEC staff guidance, and statements of the non-gov-
ernmental Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). However, 
determining what is "material" is far from a straightforward exercise. 
The SEC defines "material" as follows: "The term 'material,' when 
used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to 
any subject, limits the information required to those matters to which 
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security 
registered."21 The SEC's guidance for implementing the materiality 
standard is the major source of controversy over the limits of disclo-
sure. Modifying the SEC approach in this area is thus a key to insti-
tuting a realistic reform agenda. 
A. Regulation S-K 
Explicit environmentally related disclosure requirements are con-
tained in three parts of Regulation S-K: Item 101, Description of 
Business; Item 103, Legal Proceedings; and Item 303, Management's 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Results of Op-
erations (MD&A).22 Disclosures under Regulation S-K usually take 
18 Corporations must also disclose environmental information on the lO-Q form (quarterly 
reports) and the 8-K form (episodic reports). 
19 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1994). 
20 [d. § 240.10b-5 (1994). 
21 [d. § 240.12b-2 (1994). 
22 See Standard Instructions For Filing Forms Under Securities Act Of 1933, Securities 
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the form of narrative discussions. However, the corporate balance 
sheet and associated footnotes reflect many decisions concerning dis-
closure of environmental liabilities. The tough disclosure decisions 
begin with the questions of when, how, and the extent to which a 
corporation should recognize contingent liabilities. Although there is 
a large body of accounting literature that addresses these questions, 
some issues are particularly relevant to environmental disclosure. 
1. Item 101-How Expensive is it to Obey the Law? 
Item 101 requires a company to disclose the cost of compliance with 
federal, state, and local pollution control or environmental laws if such 
costs will have a material economic impact on the company or the 
company's subsidiaries.23 Material impacts can occur when there are 
significant outlays for capital expenditures, or material effects on 
earnings or competitive positions.24 For example, the SEC expects 
that Item 101 will compel disclosure of the costs of compliance with 
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 of a large number of affected 
companies, particularly those with toxic air emissions.25 The SEC has 
indicated that the agency will be looking for disclosure of estimates 
of increased capital and operating costs, estimates of a company's 
ability to pass these costs on to customers, and the likelihood of 
abandonment of operations that cannot be brought into compliance.26 
2. Item 103-How Much Legal Exposure? 
Apart from the general rules governing disclosure of legal proceed-
ings, the SEC has provided special instructions for legal proceedings 
that relate to the environment. A company must disclose any admin-
istrative or judicial proceeding (1) that is material to the business or 
financial condition of the company; (2) that involves a claim that 
exceeds ten percent of the company's assets; or (3) that involves a 
governmental party and a claim for damages that exceeds $100,000.27 
Note that the $100,000 threshold replaced a prior requirement to 
Exchange Act Of 1934 and Energy Policy And Conservation Act Of 1975 - Regulation S-K, 17 
C.F.R. § 229. 
23 [d. at § 229.1Ol(c)(1)(xii). 
24 [d. 
25 Richard Y. Roberts, Commissioner of the United States Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Environmental Liability Disclosure Developments, Remarks at the Dun & Bradstreet 
Corporation, D.C. Briefing on Environmental Due Diligence 3-4, Apr. 5, 1994 (transcript on file 
with author) [hereinafter Disclosure Developments]. 
26 [d. at 4. 
27 Instruction 5, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103. However, the SEC has opined that remedial costs 
incurred in CERCLA actions are not to be considered sanctions and therefore would not count 
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disclose all proceedings involving the government.28 This disclosure 
section raises several controversial issues. 
One set of controversial issues arises out of the valuation of claims 
and the determination of whether the claims are material. A com-
pany's decision to disclose legal proceedings may have far-reaching 
implications because once a proceeding is disclosed, Rule lOb-5 re-
quires disclosure of all material information necessary to avoid mis-
leading investors.29 On the other hand, a company's decision not to 
disclose is highly risky because if the decision is made in error the 
company is exposed to suit by the SEC or by investors. 
Consider a realistic hypothetical that illustrates the quandary. Act-
ing under a state statute, a state agency brings suit against a company 
to compel remediation of an inactive hazardous waste disposal site. 
On the basis of an opinion of counsel, the company believes that the 
statute is unconstitutional and hence unenforceable. However, the 
company knows that if it is required to remediate the site the costs 
will be enormous. The company's records indicate that the wastes are 
persistent in the environment and are likely to have migrated from 
the original disposal area. If the company chooses not to disclose the 
suit, the reasonableness of the company's reliance on counsel's opinion 
will come under heavy scrutiny if ultimately proven to be erroneous. 
However, if the company discloses the suit, Rule 10b-5 would likely 
also require the company to disclose its knowledge that remedial costs 
would be enormous. Such a disclosure might not only adversely affect 
the price of the company's stock, but would also provide potentially 
prejudicial information to government prosecutors. 
The SE C requires the use of the F ASB standards for the disclosure 
of contingent liabilities.30 The FASB standards call for use of a prob-
ability/magnitude test for the determination of whether to recognize 
a potential liability. Under the test, a company must balance the 
probability of a liability's occurrence with the magnitude of the liabil-
towards the $100,000 threshold. See Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 
54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 n.30 (1989) [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 6835]. 
28 Securities Act Release No. 5386 (Apr. 20, 1973) 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23m507A 
[hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 5386]. The rule stated that any proceeding brought by 
a governmental authority is deemed material. ld. 
29 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5. 
30 See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARDS No.5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES (Mar. 1975) [hereinafter ACCOUNT-
ING FOR CONTINGENCIES], reprinted in ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: ORIGINAL PRONOUNCE-
MENTSJULY 1973-JUNE 1, 1989, at 34--50 (1989) [hereinafter ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS]; see 
also Garret L. Dominy, Accounting for Environmental Contingencies and Losses, in UNDER-
STANDING ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE ToDAY 57--63 (1992). 
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ity's consequences.3! Thus, a company must recognize a potentialli-
ability with devastating consequences even if the likelihood of the 
liability's occurrence is remote. It is important to note that recogniz-
ing contingent liabilities for accounting purposes is not synonymous 
with finding contingent liabilities material for disclosure purposes. 
However, as a practical matter, once a company recognizes contingent 
liabilities that are large but remote, it is usually the case that they 
will be found to be material. Thus, separate disclosure will be re-
quired. 
A second set of controversial issues under Item 103 involves whether 
a company must disclose unasserted claims when the company knows 
or reasonably should know that the government is contemplating 
instituting a proceeding.32 While Item 103 does not explicitly require 
disclosure of uninitiated actions, a company's failure to disclose poten-
tial actions that fit this profile may be misleading. Rule lOb-5 may 
therefore require disclosure.33 This interpretation of Item 103 is highly 
controversial because it can be read to require disclosure as soon as 
a company has committed a significant environmental law violation, 
under the theory that the company can anticipate eventual govern-
ment action against it. Companies object to this interpretation be-
cause it appears to compel them to choose between subjecting them-
selves to either an environmental enforcement action or an action to 
enforce the securities laws. 
The SEC has indicated that in the context of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), the mere designation of a company as a potentially responsible 
party (PRP) at a remedial site does not trigger the duty to disclose.34 
However, designation as a PRP, together with knowledge of the com-
pany's particular circumstances, could require disclosure.35 At least 
one SEC Commissioner has stated that if sites have been identified 
where a company is a PRP, the company should disclose whether the 
estimated costs of remediation have been recognized, including an 
explanation of the uncertainties involved.36 The Commissioner also 
31 Dominy, supra note 30, at 58--61; see ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 30. 
32 For a thorough review of this problem, see Gerard A. Caron, Comment, SEC Disclosure 
Requirements for Contingent Environmental Liability, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 729 
(1987). 
33 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
34 Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 27, at 22,430 n.30. 
35 See id. 
36 Disclosure Developments, supra note 25, at 8-9. 
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stated that if it is reasonably likely that the company is a PRP at 
unidentified sites, that uncertainty, if material, should be disclosed.37 
The final controversial issue arising under Item 103 relates to how 
a company calculates the $100,000 threshold for damages in govern-
ment actions. The present SEC interpretation states that a company 
should not count any amounts that would have to be paid for remedial 
work toward the threshold, only amounts that would result from fines 
and penalties for non-compliance.38 Thus, where a company has signed 
a consent order to participate in the remediation of a site, Item 103 
does not require disclosure of that fact even though the estimated 
costs of remediation vastly exceed $100,000.39 
3. Item 303-The Real Assessment from Management 
Over time, the SEC has come to recognize the need for a narrative 
explanation of financial statements in order that investors can judge 
both the quality of earnings and the likelihood that past performance 
will be indicative of future performance. To address this need, the 
SEC adopted the MD&A requirement in 1980. In the SEC's view, the 
MD&A is intended to give investors "an opportunity to look at the 
company through the eyes of management."40 
There are two components of the MD&A that are relevant to the 
environmental disclosure debate. One component is the required dis-
cussion of current trends or uncertainties that would have a material 
effect on the company or that would cause the information disclosed 
elsewhere to not be indicative of future performance. The other com-
ponent is the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information. 
The type of information that must appear in the MD&A is intended 
to be very company specific. The SEC has therefore rejected attempts 
to standardize the requirements,41 In the SEC's view, standardization 
would foster boilerplate discussions. However, the lack of a stand-
ardized approach leaves filers with considerable discretion. In 1987, 
the SEC undertook a study to assess whether the MD&A was living 
up to its expectations. Additional guidance was provided in 1989 as a 
37 [d. at 9. 
38 This interpretation appears in the so-called "Cole letter" issued by the SEC on January 17, 
1989. See Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 27, at 22,430 n.30. 
39 The liability for remediation might have to be disclosed under other provisions of the 
securities laws, but only if the company concluded that the expense was material to investors. 
40 Request for Comments on MD&A, Securities Act Release No. 6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 
13,717 [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 6711]. 
41 See Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 27, at 22,427. 
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result of that study (1989 Guidance).42 The 1989 Guidance has wide-
ranging implications, in particular because it places the burden on 
management to objectively prove the negative if management decides 
to forego disclosure. 
The 1989 Guidance sets forth a two-part analysis for the determi-
nation of whether a company should disclose current environmental 
trends under I tern 303. Management must first determine whether a 
contingent event is reasonably likely occur.43 Unless management can 
conclude that the event is not reasonably likely to occur, management 
must assume that the event will occur.44 Second, management must 
disclose the contingent event unless it can determine that the event's 
occurrence is not reasonably likely to have a material effect on the 
company.45 This two-step approach has satisfied neither side in the 
debate and, as discussed below, may not even generate the useful 
investor information that the SEC seeks.46 
As an example, consider the case of a Midwest utility that operates 
several electrical generating plants fueled by high-sulfur coal. As part 
of its 1989 filing, the utility would be required to consider the possi-
bility that Congress could enact legislation that would regulate or cap 
annual emissions of sulfur dioxide, a precursor to acid deposition. The 
utility would need to disclose this possibility in its 10-K filing unless 
it was prepared to show (1) that it reasonably believed that Congres-
sional action was not likely to occur; or (2) that any additional controls 
that were likely to be imposed would not materially affect its business. 
Unfortunately, what the 1989 Guidance giveth with one hand, it 
taketh away with the other. Although the 1989 Guidance does change 
the burden of proof, the "reasonably likely" standard is much less 
stringent than the traditional standard used to disclose contingent 
liabilities-the probability/magnitude test.47 Under the probability/mag-
nitude test, a company is required to recognize a very large contin-
gent liability, even though the probability of its occurrence is quite 
small. Once a company recognizes such a liability the company must 
disclose the liability, if the liability is material.48 However, under the 
reasonably likely test, management need not disclose such a liability, 
42 See id. 
43 See id at 22,428. 
44 [d. at 22,430. 
45 [d. 
46 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
47 See supra, note 31 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
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regardless of the magnitude of the potential liability, if management 
can objectively show that the event is not reasonably likely to occur.49 
It should be noted, however, that these tests only address the duty 
to disclose. The tests do not dictate how the estimates of contingent 
liability are to be made. For a company, the decision whether to 
disclose is far more important than how the company derives the 
particular amount disclosed. Failure to disclose is actionable under 
the securities laws. But where a company discloses matters that later 
prove to be inaccurate due to the uncertainties involved in making 
forward-looking estimates, the company is not liable so long as its 
estimates were made in good faith and with a reasonable basis.50 
Whether the new approach will result in more disclosure is still un-
clear.51 
While some commentators have criticized the approach taken in the 
1989 Guidance as unrealistic,52 the approach does begin to address the 
very real problems that arise when the definition of materiality is 
applied in the context of corporate environmental disclosure. Under 
the traditional balancing test for disclosure, there is too much man-
agement discretion concerning environmental matters that could have 
a very significant impact on the corporation. Management's broad dis-
cretion is largely a result of the unsettled nature of the law with 
respect to many environmental issues. It is simply too easy, and 
essentially objectively unreviewable, for a company to defend a deci-
sion to withhold disclosure based on the company's interpretation of 
the law. The disclosure statements by the five companies examined 
below demonstrate the broad discretion which the rules grant to 
management.53 
Commentators have generally focused on four areas where envi-
ronmental contingencies need to be disclosed under Item 303: (1) the 
cost to comply with new environmental regulations, for example, the 
costs imposed by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments; (2) toxic tort 
liability; (3) obligations to remediate that are known only to the com-
49 The author apologizes for the continuous use of double negatives, but it is necessary to 
accurately describe the legal standards involved. 
50 See Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 27, at 2230. 
51 A 1991 study examined the lO-K reports filed by the nation's twenty largest bank holding 
companies, and an additional six banks, that operate in ten states containing many Superfund 
sites. The study found no disclosure of current liabilities related to Superfund cleanups. Amy 
Dockser Marcus & Amy Stevens, Banks' Burden in Cleanups is Questioned, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
11, 1991, at B5. 
52 See, e.g., Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Disclosure of Contingent Environmental Liabilities 
by Public Companies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129 (1992). 
53 See infra notes 80-131 and accompanying text. 
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pany; and (4) liability for contribution to the costs of an ongoing 
remedial action by the government or a responsible party. 54 The last 
two areas are especially significant because the rule under Item 103 
that relates to government proceedings involving $100,000 does not 
count remedial costs toward the threshold amount. 
Finally, it should be noted that regardless of the burden of proof, 
the disclosure requirement remains linked to the concept of material-
ity. Therefore, the potential liability in relation to the size of the 
company and other factors, such as insurance coverage, remains ger-
mane to the disclosure decision. 
B. Accounting for Contingent Liabilities 
Although this Article primarily addresses the legal issues concern-
ing environmental disclosure, these issues cannot be divorced from 
related accounting issues. This discussion is intended to provide an 
overview of the key accounting issues and to place the environmental 
disclosure issue in the context of the larger controversy. The principal 
accounting issue related to environmental disclosure concerns the 
treatment of contingent liabilities.55 In the environmental area, con-
tingent liabilities most commonly occur in four contexts: (1) fines and 
penalties arising out of violations of environmental laws; (2) remedia-
tion costs; (3) liability in toxic tort litigation; and (4) facility closure 
costs. 
The SEC requires that companies conform to GAAP and other 
rules adopted by the Commission.56 Although GAAP has been in 
existence for some time, issues that involve its application to environ-
mental liabilities have only recently received a great deal of attention. 
Four sub-issues arise in the context of applying GAAP to environ-
mental liability. First, when a contingent liability should be recognized 
in the company's accounts; second, how that liability should be meas-
ured; third, how the liability should be classified, that is, as a current 
54 See Ross H. Fishman et a!., Environmental Reporting Required by the SEC, 22 Envtl. Rep. 
(BNA) 1065, 1065-68 (Aug. 16, 1991); Archer, McMahon & Crough, SEC Reporting of Environ-
mental Liabilities, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,105 (Mar. 1990). 
55 The difference between a contingent and a "hard" liability is merely a matter of degree of 
certainty. It is obvious that when a company ignores contingent liabilities until they become 
certain, it provides a distorted picture of its financial position by overstating its financial 
strength. On the other hand, recognition ofliabilities that only have a remote chance of becoming 
realized runs the same risk in the opposite direction. While it might seem that a company would 
have no incentive to recognize liabilities that are only remotely likely, it should be noted that 
once a liability is recognized, the company can use it as a charge against income, thereby 
reducing its tax liability. 
56 See Dominy, supra note 30, at 57. 
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or capital expense; and fourth, whether the liability needs to be dis-
closed in the company's SEC filings. 
The basic rule is that an estimated loss from a contingency must be 
accrued by a charge to income if it is probable that a liability has been 
incurred and the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated.57 
Note that the recognition of the liability for accounting purposes is 
not tied to whether the liability is material to the business. 
The SEC has found that, generally, companies have not had difficulty 
in determining whether a loss is probable.58 Yet the SEC has still 
found disclosure inadequate. The Commission suspects that the source 
of the problem is related to the determination of whether a loss can 
be reasonably estimated and what that estimate should be.59 A com-
panion issue also needs clarification. This issue concerns the extent to 
which a company must address contingent losses recognized in the 
company's financial statements through notes appended to the finan-
cial statements. 
Guidance has been available for some time on a number of issues 
that the basic rule for accrual of contingent liabilities raises.60 How-
ever, as contingent liabilities occur in more and varied situations, it is 
inevitable that further questions will arise. The increasing importance 
of accounting for contingent liabilities, coupled with a lack of definitive 
guidance in several areas, has placed the issue on the agenda of 
FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF). 
Some of the most recent thinking appears in SEC Accounting Bul-
letin Number 92 (SAB 92).61 SAB 92 is a useful step in the process of 
sorting out the accounting issues relating to contingent liabilities. As 
stated in the Federal Register summary, the purpose of SAB 92 is "to 
promote timely recognition of contingent losses and to address the 
diversity in practice concerning accounting and disclosures in this 
67 ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 30, at 35. 
58 [d. 
69 See Richard Y. Roberts, Commissioner of the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Environmental Liability Disclosure, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, and Share-
holder Proposals, Remarks at the Law Education Institute and the Bureau of National Affairs, 
National CLE Conference 8, Mar. 6,1994 (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Environ-
mental Liability Disclosure]. 
60 See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FASB INTERPRETATION No. 14: 
REASONABLE ESTIMATION OF THE AMOUNT OF A Loss (Sept. 1976), reprinted in ORIGINAL 
PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 30, at 5041-43; FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, 
FASB INTERPRETATION No. 39: OFFSETTING AMOUNTS RELATING TO CERTAIN CONTRACTS, 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING SERIES, Mar. 1992; FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, 
FASB INTERPRETATION No: 20: REPORTING CHANGES UNDER AICPA STATEMENTS OF POSI-
TION, reprinted in ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 30, at 5082-83. 
61 Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 58 Fed. Reg. 32,843 (1993)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Part 
211). 
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area."62 SAB 92 accomplishes this goal by affirming the concurrence 
of the SEC staff with the EITF regarding the requirement that 
companies recognize contingent liabilities and offset contingent recov-
ery claims separately.63 The staff believes these requirements are 
especially needed in order to prevent the misrepresentation of the 
effect, likelihood, and timing of insurance recoveries.64 
SAB 92 deals with the treatment of joint and several liability, 
evaluation of uncertainties in the estimation process, and accounting 
for the time value of money. Also significant is SAB 92's duty to report 
on sites with environmental problems on a disaggregated basis in 
order to promote a full understanding of the contingencies relevant 
to a particular site. It is hoped that SAB 92 will bring greater uni-
formity to the process of accounting for environmental contingent 
liabilities in corporate financial statements. 
SAB 92 also addresses the issue of when companies must make 
additional disclosures in the notes appended to their financial state-
ments. The SEC staff states that environmental liabilities typically 
are of such significance that detailed disclosures regarding the judg-
ments and assumptions underlying the recognition and measurement 
of the liabilities are necessary to prevent the financial statements 
from being misleading.65 Such disclosure is also needed, according to 
the SEC, to fully inform readers of the range of reasonably possible 
outcomes that would have a material effect on the registrant's finan-
cial condition, results of operations, and liquidity.66 
SAB 92 gives examples of situations that would require companies 
to make further disclosure in the notes to their financial statements. 
It is important to recognize that, disclosure in the notes to the finan-
cial statements is only necessary where the particular contingent 
liability that is being recognized is found to be materia1.67 
Finally, the SEC has shown increasing concern that the financial 
statements, and, in particular, the notes to those statements, must 
present a picture consistent with disclosure made outside of those 
statements. SAB 92 itself directs that, where necessary, notes to the 
financial statements be cross-referenced to the MD&A.68 
It is still too soon to fully assess the effect of the SEC's recent 
attempts to define environmental disclosure requirements more pre-
62 [d. at 32,843. 
63 [d. at 32,844-45. 
64 Environmental Liability Disclosure, supra note 59, at 7-8. 
65 58 Fed. Reg. 32,845. 
66 [d. 
67 [d. 
68 [d. 
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cisely. This is especially true with respect to SAB 92. The SEC reports 
that there is substantially more disclosure on environmental matters 
in 10-K filings in 1993 than in the past.69 However, this observation is 
not confirmed by the sampling of companies reviewed below.70 
The SEC has announced that it expects continued scrutiny of the 
environmental component of company filings.71 Those companies that 
operate in fields such as property and casualty insurance, pulp and 
paper manufacturing, primary metal manufacturing, oil and gas pro-
duction, electricity generation, pharmaceutical manufacturing, and 
organic chemical manufacturing should anticipate intensified scrutiny. 
The SEC is also expected to focus on the consistency of corporate 
filings with the principles of SAB 92-in particular, its offsetting and 
discounting provisions.72 
The stakes are high. Failure to comply with the securities laws 
carries the potential for significant fines and penalties.73 Furthermore, 
now that many of the disclosure requirements have been clarified, the 
SEC appears to feel more confident about its ability to take serious 
enforcement action against those who fail to comply.74 
Some analysts believe that SAB 92 will precipitate considerably 
more disclosure. These analysts suggest that investors could be inun-
dated by environmental liability data in 1993 corporate annual re-
portS.75 The disclosures may in turn have an effect on stock prices. 
Those in the chemical and manufacturing industries are particularly 
vulnerable. But while many companies believe the more definitive 
requirements will result in substantive changes in their own disclo-
sure, others anticipate very little change.76 
69 Interview with Kurt Hohl, Division of Corporate Finance, United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Mar. 1994). 
70 See infra Section III. 
71 Environmental Liability Disclosure, supra note 59. 
72 Richard Y. Roberts, Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SAB 
92 and the SEC's Environmental Liability Disclosure Regulatory Approach, Remarks at the 
1994 Quinn, Ward & Kershaw Environmental Law Symposium, University of Maryland School 
of Law 5 (Apr. 8, 1994) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter SEC's Regulatory Approach]. 
73 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988). 
74 See Plishner, Environmental Financial Disclosure, CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec. 8, 1993 at 49; 
Murphy, SEC Targets Environmental Disclosure Practices, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Sept. 
6, 1993 at 23. 
75 See Plishner, Environmental Financial Disclosure, CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec. 8, 1993 at 49; 
Murphy, SEC Targets Environmental Disclosure Practices, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Sept. 
6, 1993 at 23. 
76 See Plishner, Environmental Financial Disclosure, CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec. 8, 1993 at 49; 
Murphy, SEC Targets Environmental Disclosure Practices, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Sept. 
6, 1993 at 23. 
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The lack of definite accounting rules in the environmental area has 
contributed to widespread reporting disparities among companies.77 
The Wall Street Journal reported that inadequate disclosure in this 
area is rampant, and that a recent Price Waterhouse survey found 
that sixty-two percent of 523 companies surveyed reported that they 
are aware of environmental exposures that are not recorded in their 
financial statements.78 The author's own review of the recent 10-K 
filings of five major companies with environmentally related opera-
tions confirms the breadth of the reporting disparities. 
III. REVIEW OF SAMPLE SEC FILINGS 
This section examines the recent 10-K filings of five major corpora-
tions with environmentally related activities: Exxon, Atlantic Richfield 
(ARCO), Union Carbide, Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M), 
and Warner Lambert.79 The examined filings are for the period be-
tween 1990 and 1993.80 This review provides a sense of the content of 
these filings and illustrates the uneven manner in which the filing 
requirements are implemented in practice. The filings also demon-
strate the degree to which disclosure requirements are subject to 
varying interpretations. The effectiveness of the SEC's disclosure 
requirements is thus substantially reduced if the SEC fails to clarify 
the requirements and fails to oversee compliance. Worse yet, in some 
situations where public policy would seem to overwhelmingly favor 
disclosure, it is not clear whether disclosure is required under present 
rules. 
The treatment of the Valdez oil spill in the Exxon filings is perhaps 
the most glaring example of how SUbjectivity in disclosure can render 
disclosure statements irrelevant. While it is true that investors did 
not need the securities laws in order to obtain general information 
about the spill and its potentially widespread consequences, the com-
pany took the position that very minimal disclosure was required in 
77 SEC Rule Forces More Disclosure, WALL ST. J. Dec. 13, 1993 at BI-B2. 
78 See infra Section III. 
79 The full text of the lO-K forms are available from the SEC. The forms are also available 
through computerized database retrieval systems. The CD-ROM database "Disclosure" also 
contains significant excerpts from the lO-K form. There is no prescribed form companies must 
follow in their 10-K filings. Rather, the contents are defined by the information requirements 
set forth by the SEC. Most companies use a similar format, but the title of sections which cover 
the same material may vary. When citing information, this Article employs the topical headings 
used in the specific 10-K filings. "MD&A" refers to the Management's Discussion and Analysis 
of Financial Condition and Results of Operation, which is required in alllO-Ks submitted. See 
supra section II.A.3. 
ao Only the 1990, 1991, and 1992 filings of Union Carbide were examined. 
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its filings. A similar position can be seen in the filings of some of the 
other companies. 
A. Comparison of Sample Filings 
1. Exxon 
The most noteworthy feature of the Exxon disclosure statements 
that were examined is the statements' lack of detail and specificity. 
The disclosure statements identify environmental compliance costs 
only in the most general terms. For instance, in its 1993 statement, 
Exxon identified only a lump-sum amount for annual compliance ex-
penses.81 Although compliance costs are reported as approaching $2 
billion, there is no indication as to the costs related to any particular 
type of facility or environmental problem, except for a statement that 
most costs relate to air and water conservation.82 Given that compli-
ance expenses are so high and are recurring, it would seem that Rule 
10b-5 requires a more detailed breakdown of these costs in order to 
give investors a complete picture. 
Not surprisingly, the focus of the disclosure of pending litigation is 
the group oflawsuits arising out of the grounding ofthe Exxon tanker 
Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska.~ The 1990 filing reveals that 
over two hundred related actions were commenced against Exxon, 
including a criminal indictment in the United States District Court 
for the District of Alaska.84 Exxon reported $4.655 billion net income 
in 1989 before taking into account costs associated with the Valdez 
spill.85 Costs attributable to cleanup, restoration, litigation, and re-
lated expenses net of insurance recoveries are estimated to be $1.68 
billion.86 
Amazingly, Exxon reports that the impact of this litigation is not 
considered material to its operations.87 If this litigation is not material, 
it is hardly surprising that the company does not feel compelled by 
81 EXXON CORP., 1993 FORM lO-K, MD&A (1994) [hereinafter EXXON 1993 100K REPORT]. 
82 [d. 
83 See EXXON 199310-K REPORT, supra note 79, Notes to Consolidated Firw,ncial Statements, 
note 14; EXXON CORP., 1992 FORM 100K, Notes to Consolidated Firw,ncial Statements, note 15 
(1993) [hereinafter EXXON 1992 10-K REPORT]; EXXON CORP., 1991 FORM 10-K, Notes to 
Consolidated Firw,ncial Statements, note 15 (1992) [hereinafter EXXON 1991 10-K REPORT]; 
EXXON CORP., 1990 FORM 10-K, Notes to Consolidated Firw,ncial Statements, note 15 (1991) 
[hereinafter EXXON 1990 100K REPORT]. 
84 EXXON 199110-K REPORT, supra note 83, Notes to Consolidated Firw,ncial Statements. 
85 EXXON 1990 10-K REPORT, supra note 83, MD&A. 
86 [d. 
87 [d. 
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the securities laws to disclose any other environmental litigation. 
Even as late as 1993, no mention is made of the fact that $16.5 billion 
in punitive damages was sought by the plaintiffs in the private actions 
arising out of the Valdez incident. In fact, in 1994, a jury awarded $5 
billion in punitive damages, the largest such award ever.88 
Minimal disclosure is the rule in other areas as well. In its 1993 
10-K, Exxon reports that it set aside $2.5 billion in anticipation of site 
restoration costs under CERCLA.89 However, there is no analysis of 
current trends or any insight into management's views of Exxon's 
approach to environmental problems. The investor is simply told in 
conclusory fashion that management does not believe that any costs 
in excess of the amounts already provided for would have a materially 
adverse effect upon the corporation's operations, financial condition, 
or liquidity.90 
2. Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) 
Of all the companies reviewed, ARCO's 10-K reports consistently 
contained the greatest amount of useful environmental disclosure. 
ARCO's 1993 report came far closer to fulfilling the intent of the 
securities disclosure laws than the reports of any of the other compa-
nies examined. That ARCO took the initiative to create a separate 
section in the report comprehensively and succinctly addressing all 
environmental matters is symbolically important.91 
The ARCO filings contain considerable detail about the nature of 
pending legal actions. For example, ARCO reports the extent of its 
involvement with the Exxon Valdez litigation, a class-action personal 
injury suit related to its manufacturing and sale of lead-based paints, 
a personal injury action arising out of a hazardous waste site in Texas, 
and a citizen suit related to its activities at the Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation in Washington.92 The status of each case is reviewed and, 
where settlements have been reached, settlement terms are disclosed. 
In ARCO's 1993 filing, the details of two separate suits filed by the 
states of Montana and Colorado involving natural resource-damage 
88 In re Exxon Valdez, No. A-8~95-CV (D. Alaska, Sept. 16, 1994), cited in 25 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 1029 (Sept. 24, 1994). 
89 See EXXON 1993 10-K REPORT, supra note 81, MD&A. 
9(j Id. 
91 See ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO., 1993 FORM 1O-K, Environmental Matters (1994) [hereinaf-
ter ARCO 1993 1O-K REPORT]. This section contains subsections entitled "Site Remediation," 
"Clean Air," "Environment-Related Expenditures," "Material Environmental Litigation," and 
a conclusion. 
92 See ARCO 1993 10-K REPORT, supra note 91, Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, 
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claims against the company are also disclosed.98 In each case, the 
company details the nature of the claim and the status of the proceed-
ings. AReO's disclosure does not provide estimates of the company's 
ultimate liability. 
Dovetailing with its disclosure of accruals to address future cleanup 
charges, AReO also states in its 10-Ks that the company anticipates 
removal or remediation obligations under federal, state, and local 
environmentallaws.94 AReO reports that although the extent of its 
liability is currently unknown, the liability is in the process of being 
assessed.95 AReO states that liability will not depend only on physical 
site conditions but also on the extent of its involvement relative to 
other parties and the extent to which the company is insured.96 The 
disclosure statements also note the potential for further private claims 
for personal injury arising out of toxic materials that the company 
manufactures.97 
In the "Environmental Proceedings" section of its filings, AReO 
reports government enforcement actions where penalties over $100,000 
are sought.98 This disclosure, required under Item 103, is non-discre-
tionary.99 
In AReO's MD&As, the company reviews several trends that may 
affect its financial position. These discussions provide some insights 
into management's environmental policy. Once again the likelihood of 
future removal or remedial actions is discussed.1OO Without quantify-
ing the associated costs, the company indicates the rate at which it is 
Environmental Matters; ATLANTIC RICHFIELD Co., 1992 FORM lO-K, Notes to Consolidated 
Financial Statements (1993) [hereinafter ARCO 1992 10-K REPORT]; ATLANTIC RICHFIELD 
CO., 1991 FORM 10-K, Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (1992) [hereinafter ARCO 
199110-K REPORT]. 
93 ARCO 1993 10-K REPORT, supra note 91, Environmental Matters: Material Environ-
mental Litigation. 
94 [d. at Environmental Matters: Site Remediation; ARCO 1992 lO-K REPORT, supra note 92, 
MD&A; ARCO 199110-K REPORT, supra note 92, MD&A. 
95 See ARCO 1993 10-K REPORT, supra note 91, Environmental Matters: Site Remediation; 
ARCO 1992 10-K REPORT, supra note 92, MD&A; ARCO 1991 10-K REPORT, supra note 92, 
MD&A. 
96 See ARCO 1993 10-K REPORT, supra note 91, Environmental Matters: Site Remediation; 
ARCO 1992 10-K REPORT, supra note 92, MD&A; ARCO 199110-K REPORT, supra note 92, 
MD&A. 
97 See ARCO 1993 lO-K REPORT, supra note 91, Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, 
note 12. 
98 [d. at MD&A· Environmental Proceedings. 
99 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
100 See ARCO 1993 10-K REPORT, supra note 91, MD&A; ARCO 1992 10-K REPORT, supra 
note 92, MD&A; ARCO 199110-K REPORT, supra note 92, MD&A. 
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accumulating reserves for this contingency.101 The company also iden-
tifies the need to spend about $2 billion for capital projects to meet 
the requirements of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and the 
regulations issued by the California Air Resource Board.102 
Although earlier versions of ARCO's 10-K report contained a lim-
ited amount of disclosure concerning environmental compliance costs, 
the 1993 report shows significant improvement in this area. Significantly, 
ARCO discloses both the positive and negative consequences that the 
company anticipates the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments will have 
on its operations.103 In each reporting year, ARCO provides an overall 
estimate of ongoing compliance costS.104 On the positive side, the MD&A 
indicates the company's intent to use the clean air issue to gain a 
competitive advantage: ARCO reports that it is the world's leading 
producer of MTBE, an important additive for reformulated gaso-
lines.105 ARCO indicates that the company has already introduced its 
own reformulated emission control gasolines at its service stations in 
Southern California. 
3. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M) 
Although 3M enjoys the reputation of an innovator in the environ-
mental field, its SEC filings contain little information about the com-
pany's environmental expenditures or liabilities. 3M does not identify 
the cost of compliance with environmental regulations. In the years 
in which 3M's reports were reviewed, 3M specifically identified only 
one pending legal action, an administrative action brought by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for violations 
of the Toxic Substances Control Act.106 3M acknowledges the viola-
tions but characterizes the violations as inadvertent, informing the 
investor that the size of the penalty assessment is the only issue being 
litigated. This is a clear example of an action that would likely not 
have been disclosed but for the special requirements of Item 103 
relating to government actions for damages over $100,000. 
The company also identifies that it is a named party in a number of 
state and federal actions which assert liability for past disposal of 
101 See ARCO 1993 10-K REPORT, supra note 91, MD&A; ARCO 1992 lO-K REPORT, supra 
note 92, MD&A; ARCO 19911O-K REPORT, supra note 92, MD&A. 
102 ARCO 19911O-K REPORT, supra note 92, President's Letter. 
103 See ARCO 1993 lO-K REPORT, supra note 91, Environmental Matters. 
104 [d. 
105 ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO., 1990 FORM lO-K, President's Letter (1991). 
106 MINNESOTA MINING & MFG. CO., 1990 FORM 10-K, Legal Proceedings (1991) [hereinafter 
3M 1990 10-K REPORT]. 
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hazardous wastes at inactive waste disposal sites.107 The company 
does not identify the particular sites involved. In addition, 3M asserts 
that it cannot estimate the extent of its liability because of the number 
of PRPs involved, the multiplicity of possible remedial solutions, the 
evolving state of clean-up technology, and the duration of remedial 
activity required.108 The company only reports that it believes it has 
accrued sufficient reserves to address the potential liability and that 
these accruals, in the aggregate, are not expected to have a material 
effect on the company's financial position.109 
In its 1991 filing, 3M discloses that the company intends to make 
capital investments of approximately $175 million over the next five 
years to reduce emissions significantly below the limits now set by 
regulation.no The company also identifies a five-year program to im-
prove productivity by reducing waste generation by thirty-five per-
cent and energy consumption by twenty percent.11l No information is 
included about the cost of the program or the program's expected 
savings. 
4. Union Carbide 
Union Carbide identifies its annual environmental compliance costs 
with some degree of specificity. The company identifies the total amount 
of expenditures and provides a breakdown between capital and oper-
ating expenses.112 While Union Carbide's statements do not indicate 
the precise nature of the expenditures, the statements note that, since 
the late 1980s, over eighty percent of the total expenses are consis-
tently attributable to its chemicals and plastics operation.113 That 
107 MINNESOTA MINING & MFG. Co., 1993 FORM lO-K, Legal Proceedings (1994) [hereinafter 
3M 1993 10-K REPORT]; MINNESOTA MINING & MFG. CO., 1992 FORM 10-K, Legal Proceedings 
(1993) [hereinafter 3M 1992 10-K REPORT]; MINNESOTA MINING & MFG. CO., 1991 FORM 10-K, 
Financial Footnotes: Litigation and Claims (1992) [hereinafter 3M 1991 10-K REPORT]; 3M 
199110-K REPORT, supra note 104, Financial Footnotes: Litigation and Claims. 
1083M 1990 lO-K REPORT, supra note 106, Legal Proceedings. 
109 3M 1993 lO-K REPORT, supra note 107, Legal Proceedings; 3M 1992 lO-K REPORT, supra 
note 107, Legal Proceedings; 3M 1991 lO-K REPORT, supra note 107, Financial Footnotes: 
Litigation and Claims; 3M 1990 lO-K REPORT, supra note 106, Financial Footnotes: Litigation 
and Claims. 
110 3M 199110-K REPORT, supra note 107, MD&A. 
111 [d. 
112 UNION CARBIDE CORP., 1992 FORM 10-K, MD&A- Costs Relating to Protection of the 
Environment (1993) [hereinafter UNION CARBIDE 1992 10-K REPORT]; UNION CARBIDE CORP., 
1991 FORM 10-K, MD&A- Costs Relating to Protection of the Environment (1992) [hereinafter 
UNION CARBIDE 19911O-K REPORT]; UNION CARBIDE CORP., 1990 FORM lO-K, MD&A- Costs 
Relating to Protection of the Environment (1991) [hereinafter UNION CARBIDE 1990 lO-K 
REPORT]. 
113 UNION CARBIDE 19911O-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A- Costs Relating to Protection 
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information, together with other information concerning the nature 
of that operation, provides the investor with a reasonably complete 
picture of environmental compliance costs. 
The central focus of Union Carbide's disclosure concerning pending 
litigation is the legal action arising out of the release of methyl isocy-
anate gas at the company's plant in Bhopal, India in 1984.114 The extent 
of Union Carbide's liability is clearly defined because, during the 
period reviewed, a settlement with the Indian government on civil 
liability was finalized. To its credit, Union Carbide also discloses in 
considerable detail related United States-based litigation even 
though the company believes these suits will be dismissed in light of 
the settlement in India.115 
Union Carbide also discloses that it is involved as a PRP with 
respect to an unstated number of sites.116 As do the other companies, 
Union Carbide notes the impossibility of identifying its ultimate share 
of liability with any reliability. Union Carbide does, however, indicate 
that at a majority of the sites the company anticipates little or no 
liability. This assertion is based on the assumption that costs will be 
allocated among PRPs in proportion to their relative contribution.ll7 
Union Carbide's MD&As identify a number of trends that are rele-
vant to investors. Most significant is the likelihood of increases in 
environmental protection costs arising from the company's commit-
ment to rigorous internal standards and from the imposition of strin-
gent laws and regulations.u8 Union Carbide has indicated its partici-
pation in the so-called "Responsible Care" industry initiative.ll9 Each 
year's filing provides an estimate of average annual compliance costs 
of the Environment; UNION CARBIDE 1990 100K REPORT, supra note 110, MD&A: Costs 
Relating to Protection of the Environment. 
114 UNION CARBIDE 199210-K REPORT, supra note 112, Notes to Financial Statements, note 
19; UNION CARBIDE 1991 10-K REPORT, supra note 112, Notes to Financial Statements, note 
20; UNION CARBIDE 1990 10-K REPORT, supra note 112, Notes to Financial Statements, note 
22. 
115 UNION CARBIDE 199210-K REPORT, supra note 112, Notes to Financial Statements, note 
19; UNION CARBIDE 1991 10-K REPORT, supra note 112, Notes to Financial Statements, note 
20; UNION CARBIDE 1990 lO-K REPORT, supra note 112, Notes to Financial Statements, note 
22. 
116 UNION CARBIDE 1992 lO-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A: Costs Relating to Protection 
of the Environment; UNION CARBIDE 1991 10-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A: Costs 
Relating to Protection of the Environment; UNION CARBIDE 1990 100K REPORT, supra note 
112, Legal Proceedings. 
117 UNION CARBIDE 1992 10-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A: Costs Relating to Protection 
of the Environment; UNION CARBIDE 1991 10-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A: Costs 
Relating to Protection of the Environment. 
118 UNION CARBIDE 1992 100K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A; UNION CARBIDE 19911O-K 
REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A; UNION CARBIDE 1990 lO-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A. 
119 UNION CARBIDE 1992 10-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A. The Responsible Care 
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for the upcoming five-year period, broken down into overall and capi-
tal costs for the period.120 
The MD&As go on to disclose some of the specific environmental 
programs that would support the trend toward increased costs. The 
MD&As cite the company's internal commitment to reduce toxic emis-
sions, to improve waste disposal practices, and to institute improved 
environmental audit programs. Union Carbide also cites compliance 
requirements associated with specific statutes, in particular the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments and CERCLA.l2l 
5. Warner Lambert 
Of the companies whose reports were examined, Warner Lambert 
discloses the least environmental information. The statements contain 
no information concerning current or future environmental compli-
ance costs or any information about trends that might affect the 
company. Warner Lambert only notes that it does not expect its 
compliance costs to be material.122 The only information that is specific 
to the company's own operations is that it initiated a worldwide audit 
program to ensure compliance with environmental regulations during 
1993.123 
The disclosure statements do not provide any specific information 
about legal actions in which the company is involved. There is only 
brief mention that the company is a party to a number of proceedings 
brought by EPA and various states under CERCLA or comparable 
legislation.124 The company indicates that it cannot predict the costs 
of remediation or the outcome of any litigation.125 However, manage-
initiative is an effort by the Chemical Manufacturer's Association to set standards for manage-
ment practices that go beyond simple compliance with regulatory requirements. See id. 
120 UNION CARBIDE 1992 lO-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A; UNION CARBIDE 199110-K 
REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A; UNION CARBIDE 1990 lO-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A. 
121 UNION CARBIDE 1992 lO-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A; UNION CARBIDE 199110-K 
REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A; UNION CARBIDE 1990 lO-K REPORT, supra note 112, MD&A. 
122 WARNER LAMBERT CO., 1993 FORM lO-K, MD&A (1994) [hereinafter WARNER LAMBERT 
1993 lO-K REPORT]; WARNER LAMBERT CO., 1992 FORM 10-K, MD&A (1993) [hereinafter 
WARNER LAMBERT 1992 lO-K REPORT]; WARNER LAMBERT CO., 1991 FORM lO-K, MD&A 
(1992) [hereinafter WARNER LAMBERT 19911O-K REPORT]; WARNER LAMBERT CO., 1990 FORM 
10-K, MD&A (1991) [hereinafter WARNER LAMBERT 1990 10-K REPORT]. 
123 WARNER LAMBERT 1993 lO-K REPORT, supra note 122, MD&A. 
124 WARNER LAMBERT 1993 lO-K REPORT, supra note 122, MD&A, Notes to Consolidated 
Financial Statements; WARNER LAMBERT 1992 lO-K REPORT, supra note 122, MD&A, Notes 
to Consolidated Financial Statements; WARNER LAMBERT 199110-K REPORT, supra note 122, 
MD&A, Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements; WARNER LAMBERT 1990 10-K REPORT, 
supra note 122, MD&A, Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. 
125 WARNER LAMBERT 1993 lO-K REPORT, supra note 122, MD&A, Notes to Consolidated 
1995] DISCLOSURE AND SECURITIES LAWS 247 
ment offers the opinion that it is unlikely that these costs will have a 
materially adverse effect on the company's financial position, liquidity, 
cash flow, or results of operations for any year.126 Only in its 1993 filing 
does Warner Lambert indicate that the company is accruing expenses 
relative to the costs of remediation.127 
In Warner Lambert's 199210-K report, the company reports on its 
N ovon Products Group. The group is responsible for the production 
of N ovon specialty polymers, a family of materials that are fully 
degradable in biologically active environments.128 This represents a 
potential breakthrough in the solid waste field. The report states that 
Warner Lambert expects N ovon specialty polymers to generate in-
creased revenues in 1993.129 However, Warner Lambert's latest disclo-
sure statement indicates that it intends to sell the N ovon Products 
Group.130 
B. Summary and Conclusions 
It is clear that the extent and detail of corporate environmental 
disclosure vary widely in the 10-K filings of the five corporations 
examined. In some cases, it appears that the decision to disclose 
depends upon whether the news is good or bad. However, it is unre-
alistic to expect a company to disclose matters that the law does not 
require the company to disclose, unless the company perceives that 
such disclosure will work to its benefit. 
Some of the differential may be attributed to the specific circum-
stances of the individual companies. However, given the size and 
diversity of these companies, there can be little doubt that all face 
significant challenges in the environmental field. One must conclude 
that, under present circumstances, companies retain an enormous 
Financial Statements; WARNER LAMBERT 1992 10-K REPORT, supra note 122, MD&A, Notes 
to Consolidated Financial Statements; WARNER LAMBERT 19911O-K REPORT, supra note 122, 
MD&A, Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements; WARNER LAMBERT 1990 10-K REPORT, 
supra note 122, MD&A, Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. 
126 WARNER LAMBERT 1993 10-K REPORT, supra note 122, MD&A, Notes to Consolidated 
Financial Statements; WARNER LAMBERT 1992 lO-K REPORT, supra note 122, MD&A, Notes 
to Consolidated Financial Statements; WARNER LAMBERT 19911O-K REPORT, supra note 122, 
MD&A, Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements; WARNER LAMBERT 1990 10-K REPORT, 
supra note 122, MD&A, Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. 
127 WARNER LAMBERT 1993 10-K REPORT, supra note 122, Notes to Consolidated Financial 
Statements. 
128 WARNER LAMBERT 1992 lO-K REPORT, supra note 122, MD&A. 
129 [d. 
130 WARNER LAMBERT 1993 lO-K REPORT, supra note 122, Business. 
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amount of discretion concerning the amount of environmental infor-
mation they must disclose. 
Without any common denominator, the value of disclosure under 
the Acts is significantly diminished for those who must rely upon it. 
Even where companies report on the same issues, the reported sta-
tistics are not standardized, making comparisons difficult, if not im-
possible. The SEC, by not standardizing information requirements 
and verifying the information received, is denying the investment 
community the element of reliability, a central purpose of the Acts. 
As in many areas of the law, the certainty of having a clear rule to 
rely on is far more important than ensuring that the rule is perfect. 
The questions that emerge based on a review of the current state 
of affairs are twofold. First, what is an appropriate level of disclosure 
of environmental information? Second, how can that level of disclo-
sure be required of all SEC registrants in an even-handed manner? 
The challenge of finding the answers to these questions is addressed 
in the remainder of this Article. 
IV. THE REFORM AGENDA AND THE SEC 
While any number of reforms can be proposed to promote enhanced 
disclosure, one should not lose sight of the basic purpose and philoso-
phy of the securities laws.131 The SEC perceives its role as protecting 
the investor rather than acting as an instrument of corporate 
change.132 While environmental advocates might prefer the latter 
view, the SEC's reading of the purpose of the securities laws is prob-
ably correct. At a minimum, the SEC is more likely to give serious 
consideration to changes that do not require the agency to alter its 
fundamental philosophy of securities disclosure. The sections that 
follow discuss and suggest procedural, administrative, and regulatory 
reforms that would make corporate environmental disclosure more 
meaningful to the investor. 
The SEC should begin by developing a credible threat to non-com-
pliance by enforcing existing requirements more vigorously. The SEC 
should also close loopholes in the reporting requirements and move 
toward limiting company discretion by more clearly defining the mini-
mum information that companies must submit. In defining these mini-
mums, the SEC should also assure that the format for reporting 
131 See supra, notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
132 Environmental Liability Disclosure, supra note 59. 
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allows cross-company comparisons, particularly with respect to quan-
titative information. 
A. Greater Enforcement of Existing Requirements 
While existing disclosure requirements can certainly be improved, 
such requirements are not insubstantial. Unfortunately, the SEC's 
failure to vigorously enforce such requirements significantly dimin-
ishes their usefulness to investors. The publication of the 1989 MD&A 
Guidance and SAB 92, coupled with increased cooperation between 
the EPA and the SEC, has served to increase the amount of environ-
mental information disclosed.133 It also appears that the clarification 
of a number of accounting issues in SAB 92 is likely to result in more 
detailed disclosure.l34 However, an increase in the amount of disclo-
sure will not necessarily improve the quality or usefulness of the 
information disclosed.135 
In order to ensure that companies are meeting both the letter and 
spirit of existing requirements, the SEC must adopt a more aggres-
sive enforcement posture. The SEC must take substantial steps to 
verify more accurately the information in the disclosure forms, and 
must be prepared to pursue enforcement actions where its investiga-
tions reveal non-compliance.136 
An increased SEC enforcement presence would surely have an 
impact on corporate disclosure, regardless of the results obtained in 
any particular enforcement action. The attitude of companies towards 
compliance with regulatory requirements is always influenced, con-
sciously or not, by companies' perception of whether the regulator is 
aggressively enforcing those requirements. Enforcement actions also 
serve to define the position of the agency on the meaning of require-
ments that might otherwise be ambiguous and to provide a forum for 
judicial interpretations. For these reasons, the failure of the SEC, for 
more than a decade, to bring any significant enforcement actions 
concerning the environmental disclosure requirements has reinforced 
133 See Donna Engelgau, Truth and Consequences, RESOURCES, May 1991 at 3-5. 
134 See SEC Rule Forces More Disclosure, supra note 77, at Bl. 
135 This is the opinion expressed by both Michael Northridge, Attorney with EPA Enforce-
ment Division, and Andrew Tataryn, Special Assistant to the Director of Corporate Finance at 
the SEC, in personal conversations with the author. 
136 SEC Commissioner Richard Y. Roberts has indicated that the Enforcement Division would 
be aggressively pursuing companies "for inconsistencies and lack of disclosure" about environ-
mental liabilities. SEC Rule Forces More Disclosure, supra note 77, at Bl. 
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the complacency among companies not inclined to disclose.137 An ag-
gressive enforcement posture will help substantially in reversing that 
attitude. 
It is important that any enforcement strategy that the SEC adopts 
be comprehensive. The SEC is now verifying information against 
EPA records, but that arrangement has not yet been institutionalized. 
Other information, such as assessments of the exposure to liability 
arising from private litigation, receives no SEC verification whatso-
ever.l38 On a selective basis, the SEC should independently evaluate 
private claims to see if such claims are substantial enough to warrant 
disclosure. To evaluate such claims, the SEC will need to employ 
independent counsel that possess expertise in the field of environ-
mental litigation. Given the potential losses involved, the SEC's obli-
gation to investors requires the agency to monitor the disclosure of 
private litigation liability exposure. 
B. Closing Existing Loopholes 
There are several loopholes in existing SEC rules that need to be 
addressed. These include the thresholds for the disclosure of legal 
proceedings and for the determination of materiality. Closure of these 
loopholes, coupled with a higher enforcement profile, will likely result 
in more meaningful disclosure. 
The first loophole relates to the requirement for disclosure of legal 
proceedings involving the government where potential damages are 
at least $100,000.139 The SEC presently does not require disclosure if 
the company reasonably believes that the damages will be less than 
the threshold amount.140 Legal actions brought by the government 
should carry with them the presumption that the action itself and the 
accompanying request for relief are made in good faith. Therefore, 
whenever the government sues for damages of $100,000 or more, 
companies should not be given the leeway to predict the outcome. 
Disclosure should be automatic. 
137 The SEC has announced two significant actions related to compliance with MD&A require-
ments. Although the actions do not involve environmental disclosure, they do give some cause 
to hope that the SEC will take a more aggressive enforcement posture. See SEC Charges 
Caterpillar Failed to Warn Holders of Earnings Risk Posed by Unit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1992, 
at A3 (addressing SEC actions against Caterpillar, Inc.). 
133 Interview with Andrew Tataryn, Special Assistant to the Director of Corporate Finance 
Division, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
139 See supra Section II.A.2. 
140 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
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The SEC has also opined that remedial costs arising from actions 
under CERCLA and similar statutes do not constitute "damages."141 
This characterization is correct from a legal point of view, as remedial 
costs are compensatory, nonpenal in nature. However, there does not 
appear to be any policy reason to make a significant distinction be-
tween potential liability for civil penalties and potential liability for 
remedial costs. Investors are principally concerned with the impact 
that these costs will have on the company, not how the costs are 
characterized. From the investor's point of view, the only difference 
between penalties and remedial costs is that the economic impact of 
remedial costs may be less significant because remedial costs are tax 
deductible as a business expense. However, the SEC could address 
this issue simply by requiring disclosure where the potential after-tax 
impact is $100,000 or more. Therefore, whatever the rationale for 
disclosure of penalties, the argument would be equally compelling 
when applied to remedial costs. 
The second loophole that the SEC should address is the interpre-
tation in the 1989 MD&A Guidance that reworks the traditional test 
of materiality.142 While most commentators have focused on the shift 
in the burden of proof that effectively requires companies to disprove 
the materiality of current trends, little attention has been focused on 
the substantial increase in the threshold for determining material-
ity.143 Under current rules, the MD&A need not include a discussion 
of trends or potential events with devastating financial consequences 
if the company can objectively show that the events are "not reason-
ably likely to occur."144 At the very least, the SEC should address in 
an interpretive release the meaning of the "not reasonably likely to 
occur" test. To avoid disclosure, companies should be required to show 
that the event has a de minimis likelihood of occurring, not merely 
that the likelihood of the event's occurrence is less than fifty percent. 
As the SEC becomes aware of accounting issues, the agency should 
make efforts to examine them and issue guidance expeditiously. This 
will have the effect of placing companies on notice of the SEC's 
expectations and should also help ensure consistency and a level 
playing field. 
141 See supra note 27. 
142 See supra text accompanying notes 43-48. 
143 See Fishman et al. supra note 54 at 1065--68. 
144 Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 27. 
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C. Reassessing the Materiality Standard 
The concept that requires the most scrutiny is materiality.145 The 
environmental disclosure requirements are tied to the materiality 
concept by the implementing regulations, not by the securities laws 
themselves.146 However, the concept of materiality is a statutory re-
quirement in other securities disclosure contexts, and the extension 
of the concept's use to the environmental area is not surprising.147 The 
concept evolved as a way of balancing what the SEC sees as the two 
competing concerns with which it must contend: (1) protecting the 
investor and (2) not overburdening the disclosure system with infor-
mation that is of questionable value.148 
In the context of corporate environmental matters, the way in 
which materiality is now defined fails to strike that balance properly. 
First, it is often too difficult for companies to determine the value of 
environmental liabilities on an objective basis. The histories of many 
environmental statutes and regulations are insufficient to allow for 
reasonably predictable litigation outcomes. Similarly, the cost of ac-
tions that are necessary to control or remediate pollution is difficult 
to estimate because of limitations in the understanding of ecosystems 
and because of frequent changes in technology. In short, the present 
definition of materiality ensures its unenforceability and encourages 
uneven reporting. 
The SEC need not rely on the concept of materiality to strike the 
balance it seeks. Through rulemaking, the SEC could establish mini-
mal thresholds which, if exceeded, require disclosure. The SEC 
should, after consultation with the EPA, propose a set of objective 
measures of environmental costs and performance. Such measures 
should be selected based on (1) usefulness to investors; (2) objectivity 
of the information; and (3) the degree to which the measure avoids 
the burden of producing new, i.e., otherwise unrequired, documents. 
For example, the SEC could require disclosure of annual compliance 
costs that exceed a threshold amount or that are greater than a 
particular percentage of a company's gross income. If the component 
items of environmental compliance costs were defined by regulation, 
it is likely that disclosure of such costs would meet the three tests 
145 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
146 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j and § 78m (1988 & Supp. v 1993), the statutory sources of 
authority for reporting environmental liabilities with the rules promulgated thereunder in 17 
C.F.R. pt. 229. 
147 For example, see 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988 & Supp. v 1993), which contains requirements made 
in connection with a tender offer. 
148 Securities Act Release No. 5627, supra note 17. 
1995] DISCLOSURE AND SECURITIES LAWS 253 
mentioned above. Such an approach would simultaneously address 
concerns about the broad discretion companies now have in making 
determinations about materiality.149 
In order to enable investors to make cross-company comparisons, 
the regulations should prescribe a consistent reporting format. Cur-
rently, when companies report compliance costs, some companies pro-
vide a total amount; others provide either capital or operational ex-
penditures; and still others provide information that is limited to 
domestic operations. With a minimal burden, the SEC can, and should, 
standardize the reporting format for these types of information. 
If the SEC insists on adherence to the materiality standard, the 
agency could justify instituting the above suggestions by other 
means. In particular, the SEC could hold that its rulemaking deter-
mines the materiality of this information generically, as a matter of 
law. Interestingly, the SEC itself has employed this rationale in prior 
rulemakings.15o 
D. Contents of the MD&A 
Another element of the reform agenda concerns the content of the 
MD&A. Admittedly, the very nature of the MD&A requires flexibil-
ity.151 However, the SEC could establish a set of topics that companies 
would be required to address. The SEC could also prescribe the 
format in which statistics on these topics must be reported. This 
disclosure would provide investors with a baseline of environmental 
information about a company's operations, as well as a common basis 
for comparison with other registrants. 
While the SEC envisioned the MD&A as a vehicle that would allow 
investors to see the company through the eyes of management, the 
content of the MD&A has become too dependent upon the attitude of 
management toward disclosure.152 In the SEC's attempt to avoid boi-
lerplate discussions in the MD&A, the agency has effectively given 
management a blank check. One study of the 10-K filings of the 
Standard & Poors 500 companies supported the conclusion that there 
is a widespread lack of uniformity in disclosure; the same conclusion 
reached by this author based on a more limited sampling.153 
149 For another view on the benefits of standardization of environmental reporting, see Sand 
& van Buren, Environmental Disclosure and Performance, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1347 (1991). 
150 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra Section II.A.3. 
152 See supra Section III.B. 
153 See Biersach, Inside the 10K, INVESTOR'S ENVTL. REP., Winter 1991 at 1, 12-15; see also 
supra Section III. The Standard & Poors study found a wide variability in the type, amount 
and detail of information provided by these companies. 
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'!\vo distinct reform agendas can be pursued to improve the content 
of the MD&A: (1) a limited agenda that deals with the disclosure of 
information with direct economic consequences or (2) a more exten-
sive agenda that would include information targeted to the needs of 
the "socially responsible" investor. The latter agenda is unrealistic at 
this point, given both the SEC's attitude toward environmentally 
motivated issues and a level of environmental investments that is 
currently insufficient to persuade the SEC to revise its approach. 1M 
The more modest agenda would include disclosure of items such as 
(1) the amount and type of pollution liability insurance policies-this 
would include insurance that would cover liability for personal injury 
and remediation; (2) real property the company owns or has an inter-
est in for which there is a reasonable likelihood that the value of the 
property has been environmentally impaired-unless the asset has 
already been devalued on the company's accounts to reflect that im-
pairment; (3) the projected impact of new environmental enactments 
identified by the EPA as entailing significant compliance costs;155 and 
(4) whether the company meets or exceeds existing regulatory stand-
ards. l56 
E. Summary 
There are many ways in which the SEC requirements for environ-
mental disclosure can be made more useful to investors. Improvement 
can be made without any change in the rules simply by placing in-
creased emphasis on enforcement of existing requirements. Other 
changes can be made through rule amendments that prevent abuses 
and distortions of the disclosure process, while leaving the SEC's 
basic approach intact. The final type of recommended change would 
require the SEC to adopt a new set of rules and to accept a funda-
mentally different approach to disclosure. 
154 See infra Section V. 
155 This would, of course, require coordination between the SEC and EPA and some objective 
standard by which significant compliance costs would be determined. The estimates of compli-
ance costs should be readily available, however, as EPA routinely provides Congress with such 
estimates for proposed legislation and is required by the Administrative Procedure Act to 
estimate compliance costs for any new regulatory requirements. 
156 Although it is vitally important from an investor's point of view to know whether a 
company is in compliance with regulatory standards, compelling a company to disclose non-com-
pliance raises serious policy questions which are beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth 
noting, though, that such a requirement would not run afoul of the constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination because that privilege does not extend to corporate entities. See, e.g., 
George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288-89 (1968). 
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Given the breadth of the SEC's discretion to determine what is 
necessary to implement the Securities Acts, it is unlikely that the 
SEC can be forced to adopt any of these changes through litigation. 
Hence, those who wish to advance the reform agenda need to demon-
strate to the SEC that their recommendations are consistent with the 
agency's mission. The following section examines how this might be 
accomplished. 
V. A PLAN FOR SEC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORM AGENDA 
Like any other government agency, the SEC examines its enabling 
statutes to determine its purpose and mission. In order to formulate 
a strategy that will be effective in persuading the SEC to adopt 
reform measures, it is critical to scrutinize the available evidence that 
shows how the SEC perceives its mandate. It will be far easier to 
convince the SEC that reforms are consistent with this mandate than 
to convince the SEC that it needs to rethink the nature of that 
mandate. 
A. The SEC Rosetta Stone 
The principal focus for implementing the reform agenda must be 
SEC action. In this regard, it is crucial to understand the source of 
the SEC's resistance to requiring increased environmental disclosure. 
More than a decade ago, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) sued the SEC regarding the scope of environmental disclo-
sure that should be required of publicly held companies.157 The secu-
rities releases that followed the NRDC litigation provide important 
insights concerning the issues that will need to be addressed if the 
NRDC proposals-or similar proposals suggested in this Article-are 
to have any likelihood of success.15S The releases are thus the Rosetta 
Stone for understanding the SEC's thinking on issues relating to 
environmental disclosure. 
The NRDC litigation concerned the effect of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA)159 on the SEC's decisionmaking process in 
promulgating disclosure rules to implement the securities laws. 
NEPA, a statute of general applicability, requires, among other 
157 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1031, 
1036--37 (D.C. Cir. 1979). For a more detailed treatment of the NRDC-SEC controversy, see 
Caron, supra note 33 at 733-41. 
158 See supra Section IV. 
159 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
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things, that federal agencies incorporate into their decisionmaking the 
effect that their actions will have on the environment.160 Before the 
enactment of NEPA in 1969, there was no general charge requiring 
federal agencies to consider the environmental impact of their actions. 
Most agencies operated under statutes that established "mission-ori-
ented" programs that required the agencies to pursue objectives 
regardless of the environmental impact of success.161 
In 1971, the NRDC petitioned the SEC to amend its rules to require 
additional filings designed to disclose the effect of corporate activities 
on the environment.162 The SEC considered the NRDC proposals, 
along with alternatives, in a rulemaking action, and ultimately 
adopted environmental disclosure rules much more modest than those 
proposed by the NRDC.163 The NRDC challenged these rules, but the 
rules were upheld upon judicial review.164 While the United States 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that NEPA made 
consideration of environmental factors part of the SEC's charge, the 
court granted the SEC a great deal of discretion in determining how 
to fulfill that charge consistently with its other statutory require-
ments.165 The court held that judicial intervention was appropriate 
only if the SEC's actions were arbitrary and capricious.166 Given this 
standard of review, it is highly unlikely that the SEC can be compelled 
to adopt more expansive environmental disclosure rules. However, 
the securities releases that the SEC issued in relation to its rulemak-
ing provide reason to believe that, as circumstances change, the SEC 
itself might be convinced of the wisdom and practicality of additional 
disclosure. 
In the three releases that resulted from the NRDC rulemaking 
petition, the SEC carefully analyzed the principles that govern its 
obligations under the securities laws and NEPA.167 The SEC states in 
the releases that, as a general rule, the agency's mandate is to require 
160 See id. § 4332. 
161 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 1.02 (2d ed. 1994). 
162 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 389 F. Supp. 
689, 694 (D.D.C. 1974) (setting forth contents of petition). 
163 See id. at 694-95. 
164 See id. at 692-695. 
165 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1031, 
1044-45 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
166 See id. 
167 See Notice of Public Hearing Regarding Environmental and Other Matters of Social 
Concern, Securities Act Release No. 5569 [1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
, 80,110 (Feb. 11, 1975) [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 5569]; Securities Act Release 
No. 5627, supra note 17; Rulemaking on Environmental Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 
5704 [1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) .. 80,495 (May 6, 1976) [hereinafter 
Securities Act Release No. 5704]. 
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disclosure of information that would be of interest generally to inves-
tors, rather than information that would be of value only in certain 
instances.l68 Therefore, the SEC concluded that information on issues 
of corporate social responsibility is probably outside its legal mandate 
under its organic statutes, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.169 Significantly, the SEC recognized that 
NEPA altered that mandate and required special efforts on the part 
of the agency to protect the environment.170 Nonetheless, the SEC 
believes that the securities laws were adopted almost exclusively to 
protect the economic interests of investors and to provide investors 
with sufficient information to exercise their shareholder voting rights. 
While the Commission recognizes that its regulations may have an 
indirect effect on corporate conduct, the agency has declined to im-
pose disclosure requirements in order to advance a social agenda. 
The SEC regards the decision to require disclosure of particular 
information as a balancing of competing interests. As detailed in the 
NRDC releases, the SEC examines the interest of investors in disclo-
sure and balances these considerations against the cost of disclosure 
and the likelihood that the information will prove useful to inves-
tors.l7l Although the SEC struggled in the NRDC litigation with the 
question of how NEPA might alter that balance, the agency ulti-
mately concluded that it was not a significant enough factor to justify 
disclosure if the disclosure was outside its basic charge under the 
securities laws.172 
The SEC was concerned not only that some types of information 
would prove to be too burdensome to disclose but that, due to the lack 
of standards for compiling and judging the information, disclosure 
could not be standardized.173 For example, the SEC questioned how a 
corporation would be able to comprehensively describe the effects of 
its operations on the environment.174 This difficulty would lead to 
added burdens and the production of information that might not even 
be useful to investors. The SEC also argued that much of the infor-
mation was available from alternative sources and would merely be 
duplicative.175 
168 Securities Act Release No. 5569, supra note 167. 
169 Securities Act Release No. 5627, supra note 17, at 85,713. 
170 [d. at 85,714. 
171 [d. at 85,712-13. 
172 [d. at 85,714-15. 
173 [d. at 85,110. 
174 [d. at 85,717. 
175 [d. at 85,719. 
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The SEC found that the only justification being offered by the 
NRDC that was arguably in harmony with the purposes of the secu-
rities laws was the need for investors to be informed in order to 
exercise their voting rights in an intelligent way.176 While this reason 
alone could have supported the addition of disclosure requirements, 
the SEC rejected the argument because the agency found that the 
level of investor interest in "social" issues was very low.177 The SEC 
cited statistics showing that only one percent of shareholders in-
vested in "socially responsible" investment vehicles.178 The SEC also 
relied on information that showed that shareholder resolutions having 
social implications were reported to have received only between two 
and three percent sUpport.179 
It is important to note that even though the SEC rejected the 
NRDC proposals, the SEC acknowledged its continuing obligation to 
expand or contract disclosure requirements in light of changing cir-
cumstances.180 The challenge for reformers is to structure a proposal 
that, when examined in light of current circumstances, would meet 
most, if not all, of the SEC's objections. 
B. Importance to Investors 
The most fundamental issue that must be developed to persuade 
the SEC to adopt any part of the reform agenda is the value of 
environmental disclosure to investors. The SEC is sensitive to the 
need for information that investors require to make purchasing deci-
sions and vote at shareholder meetings. The case for additional dis-
closure to serve investor interest can be based on either concern. 
In order to make the case that a type of information is needed for 
the purchasing decision, it must be shown that the information does 
in fact affect company value, or at least that investors perceive that 
it does. To show an actual impact, an analysis of the information and 
how the information affects the corporation's economic position or 
how the information reflects on management's competence is re-
quired. The strongest case would be based on an after-the-fact review 
of the effect of a particular type of information. With this evidence, it 
will be easier to document actual impact. 
176Id. at 85,711. 
177Id. at 85,719-21, 
178Id. at 85,719-21. 
179Id. at 85,720. 
180 Id. at 85,719. 
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For instance, a review of the impact of lawsuits that were not 
disclosed could be used to demonstrate that investors need to know 
more about pending lawsuits. Another study could examine the ex-
tent of the impact of insurance on environmental liabilities. Existing 
studies, though not performed with SEC disclosure requirements in 
mind, contain extensive documentation of the importance of much of 
the information for which disclosure is sought. For instance, studies 
have documented the growing portion of GNP devoted to pollution 
control measures181 and the effect of compliance costs on company 
credit ratings. l82 
With respect to information for which a demonstrable, direct eco-
nomic impact cannot be shown, the SEC will need to be convinced 
that investor interest in using "non-economic" criteria is high. This 
requires a showing that a substantial number of investors not only 
perceive that the information is important to the purchasing decision, 
but also that the investors make purchasing decisions based on this 
type of information. 
In recent years, with the rise of specialized mutual funds, there has 
been sufficient investor interest to sustain numerous funds whose 
stated purpose is to make socially responsible investments. Many of 
these funds specialize in environmentally responsible investments or 
include such investments as a significant portion of their portfolio. 
Unfortunately, because of the inherent limitations and uneven results 
of the currently required disclosure, few researchers who seek to 
evaluate social criteria for institutional investors rely on 10-K 
filings. l83 
In the securities releases that arose out of the NRDC litigation, the 
SEC examined statistics related to the number of investment deci-
181 Pollution control expenditures consumed 2.1% of GNP in 1990 and are expected to rise to 
2.6% of GNP in the year 2000 according to an EPA report to Congress, Environmental Invest-
ments: The Cost of a Clean Environment (1990). 
182 Teresa Opheim, Environmental Costs Reduce Credit Ratings, INVESTOR'S ENVTL. REP., 
Summer 1991, at 4-5. 
183 None of the six mutual funds that specialize in environmentally responsible investments 
that were reviewed by the author cited any reliance on the lO-K form by its research staff. 
Sources that were cited included government records from the EPA, Department of Defense, 
Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, and Office of Technology 
Assessment; national and local media; special interest groups; interviews with corporate per-
sonnel and labor unions; business and trade publications; and electronic legal databases. The 
funds examined were Pax World Fund, Calvert-Ariel Appreciation and Social Investment 
Funds, Parnassus Fund, Dreyfus Third Century Fund, and New Alternatives Fund. Two 
research firms, Franklin Research and Development Corporation, and the Investor Responsi-
bility Research Center (IRRC), did cite the use of the 10-K forms, though IRRC indicated it 
was of very limited value. 
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sions that utilized environmental criteria.l84 The statistics that the 
SEC relied upon are now hopelessly outdated. In recent years, invest-
ment decisions that employ environmental criteria have increased 
both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of total investments.l85 
A comprehensive study documenting these changes would support a 
compelling case for reform. 
Even though the SEC acknowledged that investors need to be well 
informed in order to make knowledgeable decisions when exercising 
their voting rights, the agency declined to require disclosure on "so-
cial" issues, because the agency found that there was little interest in 
environmentally oriented shareholder resolutions.186 However, a large 
number of such shareholder resolutions recently have been intro-
duced, especially after the grounding of the Valdez. In 1990, resolu-
tions that required compliance with the Valdez Principles187 were 
introduced at shareholder meetings of American Express, Atlantic 
Richfield, Exxon, Kerr-McGee, and Union Pacific.l88 Although these 
resolutions were defeated, support ranged from 8.5% to 16.7%.189 This 
is much higher than the two to three percent level of support cited 
by the SEC in its decision to deny the NRDC petition.1OO Clearly, this 
increase can be a powerful argument in support of the need for dis-
closure of information on corporate environmental policy irrespective 
of its economic significance. 
Although some may take the position that requiring the additional 
disclosure of this heretofore "private" information is unnecessary 
given the ability of large institutional investors to procure the same 
information through other channels, there is a solid case to the con-
trary. First, the securities laws are intended to make information 
critical to the investment decision available to all investors. Second, 
many of the alternative sources that large institutional investors are 
184 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
185 Securities Act Release No. 5627 reports that investments using social criteria accounted 
for only 213 of 1% of the portfolios of investors that were concerned enough to respond. 
Securities Act Release No. 5627, supra note 17, at 85,719. The SEC also reported in the same 
release that mutual funds using environmental criteria only had $35 billion in assets. Id. at 
85,719,85,720. 
186 See id. 
187 The Valdez Principles were developed by a group of environmental organizations, the 
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES). ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET 
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 229 (1992). They con-
stitute a statement of long-term commitment to environmental values. See id. at 228-30. 
188 Christopher J. McKenzie, Note, Environmental Investment: A Proposal for State Legis-
lation, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 349, 359--60 (1991). 
189 Id. at 360. 
190 Securities Act Release No. 5627, supra note 17, at 85,720. 
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compelled to use lack the credibility that arises from the combination 
of government verification and the penalties associated with the sub-
mission of false or misleading information under the securities laws. 
The value of including such additional information in securities filings 
can be justified on this basis even if similar information is available 
elsewhere. 
C. Burden on the Disclosure Process 
The SEC has made it clear that the importance of information to 
the investor is not the sole criterion on which the agency decides 
whether to compel disclosure.191 While almost any information is po-
tentially useful to investors, the SEC is sensitive to the extent to 
which a disclosure requirement will increase the burden on compa-
nies. In addition, the SEC is wary that excessive disclosure will result 
in a clutter of information and that investor understanding will suffer. 
Thus, the SEC has, for example, already rejected suggestions that 
companies append lengthy documents, such as environmental impact 
statements, to disclosure filings.l92 Advocates of more extensive dis-
closure must convince the SEC that additional requirements will not 
overburden the disclosure process and will also provide useful infor-
mation. 
To satisfy these concerns, proponents of the reform agenda should 
first focus on the information that can be submitted within the exist-
ing reporting structure, perhaps as part of the MD&A.l93 It is unlikely 
that the SEC will object to the inclusion of such information. As a 
strategy to convince the SEC to require reporting that would compel 
submissions beyond the existing reporting structure, proponents will 
need to demonstrate how such reforms can be accomplished with a 
minimum of burden to the companies in terms of recordkeeping and 
reporting. 
Proponents may need to design reporting forms for this data that 
meet the SEC's concerns. In doing so, proponents should carefully 
examine the information that is already being generated to satisfy 
other regulatory requirements. Proponents of additional disclosure 
must be sensitive to the SEC's concern that new disclosure not be 
duplicative of other information that is already in the public domain. 
Where similar information must be submitted pursuant to other legal 
191 [d. at 85,721. 
192 [d. at 85,724. 
193 Note that the MD&A requirement only came into existence in 1980, after the NRDC 
controversy was resolved. 
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authority, the SEC will have to be convinced that the information 
proposed for disclosure is sufficiently different to warrant separate 
publication. 
To the extent possible, the information reported to the SEC should 
require a minimum of separate recordkeeping or data gathering. The 
management of socially responsible investment firms should also be 
enlisted to help demonstrate to the SEC that disclosure can be made 
without undue burden and cost. 
VI. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION 
While this Article has focused on the SEC process, some of the 
same goals can be pursued through other means. This section dis-
cusses two particular avenues through which similar goals can be 
achieved. One route is based on the regulatory authority of individual 
states. The second is the pursuit of private actions based on the rights 
or authority of shareholders. 
A. State Action 
While the SEC requirements are the main focus of this Article, the 
more general issue is the use of the securities laws to obtain the 
disclosure of environmental information. In this regard, pursuit of a 
reform agenda must discuss the authority that states have to pursue 
similar objectives. 
Even though most regulation of securities is done by the federal 
government, states are not preempted from regulation in this field. 
In fact, the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 contains an 
explicit provision that allows for concurrent securities regulation by 
the states.194 Most states have adopted their own codes to regulate 
securities issued within their jurisdictions. These laws are commonly 
referred to as "Blue Sky Laws."195 
Federal securities regulation relies heavily on the use of disclosure 
as its principal tool. In contrast, Blue Sky Laws generally call for 
regulation of the individuals and entities involved in security trans-
actions, such as by requiring the licensing of brokers.196 However, 
there is no legal impediment preventing states from adopting some 
194 15 U.S.C. § 77r-l(a)(1). 
195 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352--359(h) (McKinney 1984) (commonly referred to as 
the "Martin Act"). 
196 See Jack H. Halpern, Introduction to State Securities, Regulations, in PLI CORPORATE 
LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 698---BLUE SKY LAWS: STATE REGULATION 
OF SECURITIES 9, 15 (1985). 
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or all of the disclosure requirements recommended in this Article. 
This type of reform would be particularly effective if it were insti-
tuted in states in which the financial centers where most securities 
are registered are located. 
B. Private Action 
In two cases, the reform agenda can be pursued without reference 
to any government action. The first case relates to the enforcement 
of existing SEC requirements. The securities laws provide a cause of 
action to investors against companies that fail to comply with disclo-
sure requirements.197 Hence, private litigation, or the threat of private 
litigation, is a tool that can be used to push companies toward more 
disclosure. The obvious drawback to private litigation is the large 
monetary advantage that a corporation would likely have in defending 
such an action. Nonetheless, in the case of blatant violations, this 
possibility should not be abandoned. To improve chances for success, 
interested parties could concentrate their resources on one or two 
high-profile actions. 
The second type of private action is the opportunity for sharehold-
ers to convince or compel corporate management to expand disclosure 
beyond what is legally required. A number of attempts have been 
made to introduce resolutions at shareholder meetings that would 
require the adoption of more extensive corporate environmental dis-
closure policies, though to date none have been successful.198 However, 
in a recent case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit found that a company had misrepresented its environmental 
record in responding to a shareholder proposal urging adoption of the 
Valdez Principles.199 In that case, the court ordered the company to 
disclose the contents of its opinion with the following year's proxy 
materials.20o 
197 15 u.s.c. §§ 77k, 771, 77n; Securities Act Release No. 5704, supra note 158, at 86,291; see, 
e.g., Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc., 589 F. Supp 395 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
198 See, e.g., INTERFAITH CENTER ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, Church Proxy Resolu-
tions (January 1991), which provides a text of resolutions that have been offered at shareholder 
meetings together with an identification of all the companies with which they have been filed. 
There has been some success with placing shareholder resolutions on the annual meeting 
agenda that are intended to change corporate environmental policy. See Roosevelt v. DuPont, 
958 F.2d 416, 417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (proposal to accelerate phaseout of ozone-depleting chlo-
rofluorocarbons). 
199 See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. International Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190, 1194, 1199 
(2d Cir. 1993); see also supra note 187. 
200 See United Paperworkers, 985 F.2d at 1202. 
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Although the success of shareholder resolutions does not depend 
on government action, the SEC does have the authority to determine 
whether shareholder resolutions must be included with proxy mate-
rials.201 The SEC has recently issued at least one favorable ruling 
upholding the right to include shareholder proposals with proxy ma-
terials.202 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The federal securities laws provide the SEC with a great deal of 
discretion to determine what information registrants will be required 
to disclose. There is little doubt that the SEC has the necessary 
authority to require the type of environmental disclosure discussed 
in this Article. It is clear, however, that presently the SEC is not 
convinced that the disclosure of such information is consistent with 
its statutory mandate. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that institutional investors who spe-
cialize in environmentally responsible investments do not appear to 
utilize the environmental disclosure required by the SEC as a source 
of information for investment decisions.203 The reasons for this are not 
entirely clear, but it appears to be a combination of (1) insufficient 
information or lack of detail and (2) no assurance that the information 
is accurate because of the absence of SEC oversight. Given the well 
documented effect that environmental compliance costs and environ-
mental liabilities can have on a company, the absence of useful disclo-
sure for investors and potential investors appears to constitute a 
failure to fulfill the intent of the securities laws. 
The SEC's discomfort with expanded environmental disclosure 
stems, in part, from the nature of the information sources upon which 
the agency would need to rely. Rather than taking the information 
from corporate balance sheets, companies would have to garner such 
information from nontraditional sources with which the SEC is unfa-
miliar and which are, in the SEC's view, too subjective. The SEC also 
seems concerned that the information will be too voluminous and 
unwieldy for 10-K disclosure. While the concerns of the SEC are far 
201 Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(d). 
202 This case involved the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and concerned a 
proposal that the company implement a policy of evaluating the environmental rights impact of 
its business in Mexico. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 19155 
(SEC). In another action with a contrary result, the decision of the SEC is in litigation. See New 
York City Employees' Retirement System v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 843 F. Supp. 858, 861 
(S.D.N.Y 1994). 
203 See supra Section III. 
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from trivial, such concerns do not appear to be insurmountable. Care-
ful study is needed to standardize the information that will be dis-
closed so as to satisfy the SEC's concerns. 
The existing environmental disclosure requirements, though tied 
exclusively to economic impacts on the corporation, are not insubstan-
tial. However, filings made pursuant to those requirements are very 
inconsistent. This variation can be attributed to requirements in-
sufficiently well defined and a lack of an SEC enforcement presence. 
The SEC should vigorously enforce the existing requirements for 
environmental disclosure and adopt more objective standards for de-
termining what environmental information companies must disclose. 
Environmental disclosure should be extended to information that is 
of particular significance to the "socially responsible" investor. While 
the SEC is not disposed to require any disclosure in the environ-
mental area that is not specifically tied to materiality in the economic 
sense, some opportunities are worth exploring. Proponents of disclo-
sure will have to persuade the SEC that disclosure is required by 
demonstrating that the information sought falls within the areas that 
are protected by the federal securities laws. While a similar effort 
undertaken by the NRDC in the 1970s was unsuccessful, there is 
reason to believe that circumstances have changed such that a prop-
erly supported rule making petition would now have a reasonable 
chance of success. 
Proponents of disclosure should first push the SEC to more vigor-
ously enforce the requirements that are already on the books. Propo-
nents should also demonstrate the impacts that existing loopholes 
may have on the disclosure process, preferably with real examples. 
In addition, proponents should explore the opportunity to pursue a 
rulemaking petition with the agency. Such a petition should be as 
specific as possible in terms of the requirements it suggests. The 
petition should also demonstrate that these new requirements will not 
overburden the disclosure process and that the new requirements will 
provide useful information to actual and potential investors. 
Finally, other avenues might also be pursued. Among these are the 
encouragement of both private and government enforcement of exist-
ing requirements, and an appeal to state regulators to adopt some of 
the requirements that the SEC rejects. 
If these reforms are implemented and enforced, the disclosure proc-
ess will become a meaningful tool for investors. The reforms will also 
have the serendipitous effect of promoting the broader public good 
that results from sound environmental management practices in cor-
porate America. 
